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 The time and place of the postwar struggle of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) 
against the Soviet regime in West Ukraine contradicted two foundational myths of late Soviet 
society: 1) the myth of the Great Patriotic War, and 2) the myth of the Friendship of the Peoples.  
This thesis examines how Soviet-Russian mass media dealt with these contradictions in the 
decades leading up to perestroika.  The Soviet state attempted to excise the UPA’s postwar 
activities from collective memory through omission until the early 1980s, when it launched a 
propaganda campaign to expose and demonize the UPA.  The new political circumstances of the 
‘Second Cold War’ account for the timing of this campaign, but the well worn language and 
arguments it employed reflected the stagnation of the Party’s postwar ideology, which posited the 
unity and incorruptibility of the “new historical community of the Soviet people,” and 




      The Ukrainian Insurgent Army and Postwar Soviet Mythology....................................6
 
      The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists in the Soviet Press and 
            Film, 1945-1970s...........................................................................................................9
      “We Have No Right to Forget!”...................................................................................18 
                  Conclusion....................................................................................................................31
REFERENCES........................................................................................................................36
iv
 Cheerfulness, the good conscience, the joyful deed, confidence in the future — all of 
 them depend, in the case of the individual as of a nation, on the existence of a line 
 dividing the bright and discernible from the unilluminable and dark; on one’s own being 
 just as able to forget at the right time as to remember at the right time; on the possession 
 of a powerful instinct for sensing when it is necessary to feel historically and when 
 unhistorically.
—Friedrich Nietzsche1
 The end of the Second World War did not herald the resumption of peace in West 
Ukraine, the region of modern-day Ukraine that had been a part of Poland from 1919 to 1939.  A 
large and well entrenched insurgency of Ukrainian nationalist guerrillas carried on fighting 
against the return of Soviet power to the region for the remainder of the decade.  The Soviet 
regime’s protracted struggle against the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN)—a 
militant, far rightwing, underground Ukrainian political party founded in 1929 to fight for an 
independent, ethnically homogeneous Ukrainian nation-state—and its armed wing, the Ukrainian 
Insurgent Army (UPA), soon acquired an exterminatory character.2  After the Soviet authorities 
had militarily wiped out the UPA and its popular support structure in the late 1940s, they turned 
to the perhaps more difficult task of covering it up, striking it from the public record, and erasing 
it from collective memory.  The death of Iosif Stalin in 1953 and the advent of Nikita 
1 Friedrich Nietzsche, “On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life,” in Untimely Meditations, ed. 
Daniel Breazeale, trans. R. J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 63. 
2 On the OUN, see Alexander J Motyl, The Turn to the Right: The Ideological Origins and Development of 
Ukrainian Nationalism, 1919-1929 (Boulder, CO: East European Quarterly, 1980); and David R. Marples, 
Heroes and Villains: Creating National History in Contemporary Ukraine (Budapest: Central European 
University Press, 2007).  On the UPA insurgency and its pacification, see John Armstrong, Ukrainian 
Nationalism, 1939-1945 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1955); Jeffrey Burds, “Agentura: Soviet 
Informants’ Networks in the Ukrainian Underground in Galicia, 1944-48,” East European Politics and 
Societies 11 (December 1996): 89-130; Jeffrey Burds, “Gender and Policing in Soviet West Ukraine, 
1944-1948,” Cahiers du Monde russe 42 (April - December 2001): 279-319; Amir Weiner, Making Sense of 
War: The Second World War and the Fate of the Bolshevik Revolution (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2001), 162-90.
Khrushchev’s “Thaw” did not signal a retreat from this policy.3  Once it became apparent that the 
memory of the UPA could not be suppressed, Soviet propaganda blackened its reputation and 
vehemently dissociated it from the “new historical community of the Soviet people.” 
 What motivated the Soviet damnatio memoriae of the UPA?  Historian Amir Weiner’s 
argument that the very existence of the anticommunist UPA contradicted the official Soviet myth 
of the Great Patriotic War provides a clear motive for the suppression of the UPA’s history.4  The 
myth of the Great Patriotic War held that the experience of the Second World War produced a 
morally pure and monolithic “Soviet people.”  According to the war myth, those who had not 
fought against the Nazis or actively collaborated with them could not be a part of the new Soviet 
community.  Despite post-Stalinist reforms and the 1955 amnesty decree of wartime 
collaborators,5 the Soviet party-state did not end or renegotiate its austere pursuit of justice 
against the living wartime members of the UPA and their families.  Instead, the postwar Soviet 
polity branded the UPA as timelessly “irredeemable,” and slated it for complete, existential 
obliteration.   In this study, I use the subject of the OUN/UPA in Soviet mass media to apply 
Weiner’s thesis to the late Soviet period, which falls outside of the scope of his study, to show 
why postwar Soviet texts practiced “excisionary memory” with respect to the Ukrainian 
nationalist insurgency, and what discursive techniques they employed.  I trace how these 
techniques changed, and why.  
 In addressing these questions, my work is informed by historian Serhy Yekelchyk’s 
monograph on Soviet version of Ukrainian history.6  Yekelchyk argues that, beginning in the 
2
3 On the contrary, the Soviet bureaucracy's surveillance and censorship, while in other ways substantially 
more tolerant than it was during Stalin’s reign, expanded and deepened during the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, 
allowing the Communist Party to enhance its control over public discourse and closely manage the 
quantity, quality, and context of references to the OUN/UPA.  See A. V. Blium, Kak eto delalosʹ′ v 
Leningrade : Tsenzura v gody ottepeli, zastoia i perestroiki, 1953-1991 (Sankt-Peterburg: Akademicheskii 
proekt, 2005).  
4 Weiner, Making Sense of War, 182-90.
5 Unlike similar amnesties in the West, the USSR’s 1955 decree did not extend to those convicted of the 
“murder and torture of Soviet citizens,” and this certainly included UPA veterans as a collective.  
6 Serhy Yekelchyk, Stalin’s Empire of Memory: Russian-Ukrainian Relations in the Soviet Historical 
Imagination (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004).
1930s, Soviet authorities imposed a Russocentric, imperialist conception of Ukrainian history and 
identity on Soviet Ukraine.  This discourse produced the “Friendship of the Peoples” myth, which 
held that centuries of historical progress bonded the nations of the Soviet Union together under 
the aegis of the “Great Russian people.”  This myth served to legitimize the pre- and 
postrevolutionary union of Russia and Ukraine under the former’s hegemony, and forecasted their 
inevitable “drawing-together” and “fusion” into one nation.  Despite the efforts of Party 
ideologues and censors, however, the creation of a “single, coherent community” of memory 
between Russians and Ukrainians remained unattainable.7   Yekelchyk’s study of official attempts 
to forge this common history and identity focuses on the “Ukrainian” perspective, ends with the 
Stalinist period, and does not address the subject of the OUN/UPA in Soviet discourse.  In 
examining the particularly contentious historical issue of the OUN/UPA from the “Russian” 
perspective, I use Yekelchyk’s framework to shed light upon the official regulation of imagined 
Russian-Ukrainian relations in the postwar Soviet context.8   I show how Soviet discourse strived 
to maintain “Stalin’s empire of memory” after Stalin by omitting and, beginning in the late 1970s, 
calumniating the UPA.  
 My study is the first to systematically analyze references to the OUN/UPA in the 
discourse of Soviet-Russian mass media.  It begins with the end of the Second World War in 1945 
and ends roughly with the onset of M. S. Gorbachev’s reforms in 1985, when various forces 
conspired to undermine the mythological foundation of the multinational Soviet state.  Unlike 
Weiner and Yekelchyk, I largely rely upon public, state-sanctioned, Russophone sources that 
shaped and reflected the attitudes and beliefs of the “center” or “metropole” (i.e. Moscow and to a 
lesser extent, Kiev) as opposed to those of the “periphery” or “borderlands” (i.e. West Ukraine).  
In accordance with Yekelchyk’s understanding of Russia’s relation to Ukraine in the post-Stalinist 
3
7 Ibid., 153-161.
8 Historian Stephen Velychenko’s analysis of Soviet-Russian textbooks, articles, and monographs on the 
history of Soviet Ukraine notes this continuation of Russocentrism in the post-Stalinist period, but does not 
address references to the OUN/UPA either. Stephen Velychenko,  Shaping Identity in Eastern Europe and 
Russia: Soviet-Russian and Polish Accounts of Ukrainian History, 1914-1991 (New York: St. Martin's 
Press, 1993). 
Soviet context as essentially “imperial,” I use these terms to signify the “colonizer” (center) and 
the “colonized” (periphery).  The perspectives and attitudes of the latter are important, interesting, 
and complicated, but are not investigated here.  As a result, I have not engaged Ukrainian sources 
unless they were widely distributed to Russian audiences (as in the case of films and Russian-
language books with large press runs).  I have combed through the digital archives of Pravda and 
Izvestiia from 1945 to 1985 for references to the OUN/UPA, using these mass-circulation 
newspapers to ascertain the character of official attempts to shape popular opinion.9  I have also 
surveyed every published, Soviet-Russian source to my knowledge dealing with the OUN/UPA, 
all of which were issued between 1981 and 1985.  I supplement these sources with analyses of 
three Soviet films dealing with the OUN/UPA, which were all produced in Ukraine and shown to 
Russian audiences, but met different fates.10  Although my source base is not comprehensive, I 
am nonetheless confident that my conclusions demonstrate the basic contours and development of 
postwar Soviet-Russian discourse on the OUN/UPA.  Here it is important to distinguish between 
the OUN, which continued to exist and struggle against Soviet power throughout the Cold War, 
and the UPA, which officially disbanded in 1949 (with localized activity persisting into the 
mid-1950s).  Between 1945 and the late 1970s, articles in Izvestiia, Pravda, and Argumenty i 
4
9 I have done the same with Russian newspaper Argumenty i fakty (Arguments and Facts) and the main 
Soviet historical journal Voprosy istorii (Problems of History) available through the Universal Databases of 
“Russian Central Newspapers” and “Social Sciences & Humanities,” respectively.  East View’s search 
engine has greatly expedited my research.  https://dlib-eastview-com.libproxy.lib.unc.edu/
10 The fact that they were produced in Ukraine as opposed to Russia indicates the greater interest of 
Ukrainians in the OUN/UPA and the unique political situation in Soviet Ukraine.  During the late 1960s and 
1970s, Moscow suspected many Ukrainian Party members and university students of “local 
nationalism,” (see footnotes 42 and 50, below).  Bagiarnye berega, directed by Iaroslav Lupii, Odessa Film 
Studios, 1979; Visokii Pereval, directed by Aleksandr Denisenko, Dovzhenko Film Studios, 1981; and 
Belaia ptitsa s chernoi otmetinoi, directed by Yuri Il’enko, Dovzhenko Film Studios, 1971. I have identified 
these three films (the only ones of their kind, to my knowledge) using the lists and notations in M. Pavlova,  
Sovetskie Khudozhestvennye Fil’my: Annotirovannyi Katalog (Moscow: Izd-vo Vserossiiskoi gazety “Niva 
Rossii,” 1995).  It should also be noted that Czech film director Frantisek Vlacil made two films set in 1947 
featuring UPA guerillas in supporting roles:  Shadows of a Hot Summer (Stiny horkeho leta, 1977), and The 
Little Shepherd Boy from the Valley (Pasacek z doliny, 1983).
fakty,11 and the journal Voprosy istorii mentioned “banderovtsy,”12  “bourgeois Ukrainian 
nationalists,” “butchers,” “bandits,” “spies,” “criminals,” and “hitlerites,” but rarely, and only in 
passing, when referring to the wartime UPA.13  Soviet-Russian discourse made numerous 
references to the OUN concerning its activities abroad, but did not explicitly mention the UPA 
insurgency in postwar West Ukraine at all until the late 1970s and early 1980s.14  
 The “unmasking” or exposure (oblichenie)15 of the UPA in the late 1970s and early 1980s
—like the thirty-year policy of omission it superseded—represented an attempt to reaffirm, not 
alter, the Soviet polity’s foundational postwar mythology.  A “myth” is a “symbolic reconstruction 
of [a] community’s formation” that provides it with a “sense of its meaning and purpose.”16  By 
5
11 Argumenty i fakty was and is a less reputable news source than Pravda or Izvestiia, but it reached a wide 
readership, touched on issues relevant to this study, and conformed to the authorities’ expectations, making 
it another tool for managing collective memory of the UPA in the Soviet Union. 
12 Banderovsty translates as “banderites.”  It was the common Soviet epithet for OUN and UPA members.  
It comes from the name of Stepan Bandera, a prominent OUN leader.  “Banderovshchina” is the Soviet 
term for the ideology of and support for the Bandera faction of the OUN (the OUN-B). 
13 This is not to suggest that UPA fighters were under no circumstances any of these things.  In a number of 
cases, they were.  The majority of the Soviet and Western historiography on the OUN/UPA revolves around 
the complicated and contentious matter of wartime collaboration and criminality, which is beyond the scope 
of this paper.  For obvious reasons, both Soviet and Ukrainian nationalist historical accounts of the OUN/
UPA must be approached critically.  This study is chiefly concerned with the former, but it should be noted 
that nationalist historians—such as present-day OUN(z) members Taras Hunczak and Peter J. Pitichnyj—
who argue that the OUN/UPA leadership never made an official policy of ethnic cleansing and did not bear 
a clear political and ideological affinity to Nazism have been compelled, not unlike Soviet scholars, to rely 
on omissions and obfuscations. John-Paul Himka, “War Criminality: A Blank Spot in the Collective 
Memory of the Ukrainian Diaspora.”. Spaces of Identity, 5 no. 1 (2005): 9–24.  Wiktor Poliszczuk, 
Christina Eljasz, and Lester Korneluk, Bitter Truth: The Criminality of the Organization of Ukrainian 
Nationalists (OUN) and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA): The Testimony of a Ukrainian (Toronto: 
Nakl. autora, 1999); Per Anders Rudling, “Historical Representation of the Wartime Accounts of the 
Activities of the OUN-UPA (Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists—Ukrainian Insurgent Army),” East 
European Jewish Affairs 36, no. 2 (2006): 163-189.    
14 The full name of the UPA (Ukrainskaia povstancheskaia armiia) goes virtually unmentioned in the 
mainstream Soviet press and in Soviet historical writing. Indeed, the acronym itself finds more use in 
reference to a faction in the Angolan Civil War.  A. M. Khazanov, “Angola: Bor’ba za nezavisimost’,” 
Voprosy istorii 5 (August 1978): 115-29.
15 Oblichenie was a traditional Russian Orthodox and, later, Bolshevik practice of  public revelation and 
accusation, intended to subject individual sinners to the collective judgment of the assembled people.  Oleg 
Kharkhordin, The Collective and the Individual in Russia: A Study of Practices (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1999), 212-38.
16 A myth, which need not be empirically verified, comes to explain and eventually define reality for its 
believers, who need only to appear to believe the myth for the myth to retain its community-defining 
power.  Graeme Gill, Symbols and Legitimacy in Soviet Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2011), 3-4.
“postwar mythology” I mean the Soviet myths of the “Friendship of the Peoples” and the “Great 
Patriotic War.”17  After victory in the Second World War and the death of Stalin in 1953, these 
two interlocked myths ascended to prominence in Soviet culture.18  In combination, they 
explained the fusing of Soviet nationalities into the spiritually undifferentiated whole of the 
“Soviet people.”19  These myths defined who the postwar Soviet community included and 
excluded, and cast the relationship between the two as a struggle between good and evil.  They 
formed major components of the overarching metanarrative of Marxism-Leninism, which infused 
Soviet discourse with its peculiar language, values, and principles.  The complete philosophy of 
history of Soviet ideology provided the “Soviet people” with an account of its past victimhood 
under the knout of capitalism and fascism, its ongoing struggle against “Western imperialism,” 
and the inevitability of its future triumph—the attainment of the classless, stateless, and 
nationless utopia of communism at the end of history.  For all of its grandiose sweep, however, 
the postwar Soviet mythos could not satisfactorily account for the recalcitrant presence of the 
UPA among the “Soviet people” after the war had been won. 
The Ukrainian Insurgent Army and Postwar Soviet Mythology
 For decades after the pacification of West Ukraine, the OUN/UPA remained a taboo 
subject in the Soviet Union’s public discourse.  The fact that a loosely organized faction of far 
rightwing, Russophobic nationalists had managed to hold out and fight, with negligible external 
support, for years after West Ukraine’s “liberation” remained an acute, politically sensitive 
6
17 My understanding of these two myths in particular is chiefly informed, respectively, by: Lowell Tillett, 
The Great Friendship: Soviet Historians on the Non-Russian Nationalities (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 1969); and Weiner, Making Sense of War.  I use the terms “mythology,” “mythos,” 
and “metanarrative” interchangeably.
18 Graeme Gill has posited a total of six Soviet myths (prominent or unimportant at different points in 
Soviet history), including the myth of the October Revolution, the myth of the construction of socialism, 
the myth of the leadership, the war myth, and the myths of external and internal opposition to the Party.  I 
have not followed his taxonomy, but have found his overall conceptual framework useful.  Gill, Symbols 
and Legitimacy, 4-5.
19 Though, as we shall see, the Soviet mythos attributed a leading role to the “Great Russian” nation.  Gill, 
Symbols and Legitimacy, 154.
embarrassment for the Soviet regime.  The tenacity of the OUN/UPA’s resistance in the forests 
and villages of West Ukraine—a region that the Soviet regime was especially keen to represent as 
loyal, prosperous, and secure—indicated that many locals resented Soviet power and supported 
the nationalist partisans.20  These historical realities put the phenomenon of Ukrainian 
nationalism at complete variance with the reformulated metanarrative of postwar Soviet 
discourse.  
 A full, public reckoning of the UPA as a third wartime combatant in its opposition to both 
Nazism and Communism would have contradicted the strictly dualistic myth of the Great 
Patriotic War, which understood the war as the cleansing baptism-by-fire of the future, socialist 
society.  This understanding of history and progress left no room for moral grayness, forgiveness, 
or compromise in the construction of the new postwar order.  The defenders of the October 
Revolution, which the war myth identified with the guiltless and monolithic “Soviet People,” 
could not be accused of or charged with the sin of “collaboration.”  “In other words,” Weiner 
writes, “blame for the initial humiliating defeats and atrocities against segments of one’s own 
society was shifted to an alien element.”21  If individual Ukrainians had participated in the vile 
business of the fascist invaders, they had done so because they were not, after all, Soviets or 
Ukrainians.  Instead, they were the “eternal enemies whom the war and occupation helped to 
uncover.”22  They were not of the people, but against the people, “antipeople” (antinarodnye).  
They were not patriotic Ukrainians, but foreign impostors.  In the immediate postwar years, 
Soviet propaganda obsessively conflated Ukrainian nationalism with Nazism, demanding that 
7
20 The drive to purge West Ukrainian memory of nationalist tropes and martyrs coincided with the 
destruction of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic (Uniate) Church—a bastion of traditional West Ukrainian 
culture—which the Soviet regime accused of supporting the nationalist underground.  Bohdan Rostyslav 
Bociurkiw, The Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church and the Soviet State, 1939-1950 (Toronto: Canadian 
Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 1996).
21 Weiner, Making Sense of War, 135.
22 Ibid., 136-37.
justice be unmercifully meted out against its adherents.23  The OUN/UPA had stood on the wrong 
side of history; ipso facto the Party pronounced its annihilation inevitable and irreversible.  
 A full, public reckoning of the UPA’s support in broad swaths of West Ukrainian society 
would have similarly contradicted the Friendship of the Peoples myth, which made an exemplar 
of the particularly close, peaceful, and sacred bond between the “fraternal” Russian and 
Ukrainian nations.24  Antebellum Soviet ideology had asserted that hatreds among the nations in 
the “darkness” of the former Russian Empire vanished in the “light” of socialism after October 
1917.  According to the Marxist-Leninist theory of history, socialism heralded the “drawing-
together” and eventual dissolution of the world’s nationalities under communism.  Throughout 
the 1930s, the Party allowed Soviet historians to acknowledge the enmity between Ukrainians and 
Russians prior to 1917, but only on the condition that they presented the conquest of Ukraine and 
other non-Russian countries by the tsars as an essentially progressive “lesser of two evils.”25  
 The Second World War marked a major turning point in the development of Soviet 
nationalities policy.  The Party rehabilitated the ideas of Ukrainian historians previously 
condemned as “bourgeois nationalist” or even “fascist,” and placed them in the service of 
whipping up patriotic fervor among the newly christened “Great Ukrainian nation” to aid in the 
defeat of Nazism.26  After victory, however, Soviet historians aggressively reverted to a 
Russocentric, imperialist narrative that condemned the previously exalted non-Russian national 
heroes and independence struggles as “treacherous” and “reactionary.”  Thereafter, the authorities 
8
23 Eventually, official Soviet discourse’s demonization of the OUN/UPA as “Hitlerites” would expand to 
include every conceivable external enemy of Soviet power, no matter how tenuous the allegation.  Ibid., 
162-90.  
24 Tillett, The Great Friendship, 26-34.  On Pokrovskii, see George M. Enteen, The Soviet Scholar-
Bureaucrat: M. N. Pokrovskiĭ and the Society of Marxist Historians (University Park: Pennsylvania State 
University Press, 1978), 6.
25  Originally, under the leadership of historian M. N. Pokrovskii, the Soviet historical profession 
condemned Russian colonialism as an “absolute evil,” and the non-Russians who fought against it as 
sympathetic freedom fighters.  In the early 1930s, however, Pokrovkii’s school came under attack, and the 
Party adopted a new interpretation of the history of Russian-Ukrainian relations. At this time, the regime 
purged dozens of ostensibly “bourgeois nationalist” Ukrainian historians.  James E. Mace, Communism and 
the Dilemmas of National Liberation: National Communism in Soviet Ukraine, 1918-1933  (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1983). 
26 Tillet, The Great Friendship, 58-85. 
expected Soviet histories to emphasize Ukraine’s junior status vis-à-vis Russia—the “elder 
brother” in the Soviet “family of nations.”27  Thus the new leadership branded heroic figures in 
the Ukrainian nationalist mythos as “traitors” who had resisted the rule of Moscow or Saint 
Petersburg.28  As the “lesser of two evils” became an “absolute good,” the new, officially 
sanctioned version of history extended the purported lack of national hostility among the peoples 
of the Soviet Union and the progressiveness of Russian colonialism into the most distant periods 
of the prerevolutionary era.29  But if the prerevolutionary legacies of non-Russian, anti-imperial 
figures could not be read into the myth of Friendship of the Peoples, then so much the worse for 
the UPA, whose war against Russian domination had occurred after the Revolution’s triumphant 
victory in the Great Patriotic War and within the territory of the Soviet Union’s purportedly 
internationalist utopia.      
The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists in the Soviet Press and Film, 1945-1970s
 Pravda and Izvestiia did not cover the UPA insurgency in West Ukraine while it was 
happening in the late 1940s and early 1950s.  The subject of the OUN, however, appears twice in 
connection with Soviet efforts to secure the return of refugees to the USSR.  Two articles 
published in 1946 accused the OUN or “Ukrainian-German fascists” of fleeing abroad to escape 
9
27 This new program applied to any centuries-old episodes in Ukraine’s past that challenged the official 
Soviet narrative of the progressiveness of imperial Russia’s expansion into the region, above all Bohdan 
Khmelnytsky’s 1654 alliance with Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich, the tercentenary of which was then 
approaching.  
28 Two of the most common targets were Hetman Ivan Mazepa—the Ukrainian Cossack who had sided 
with Sweden in exchange for the promise of Ukrainian independence against Peter I in the Great Northern 
War—and Symon Petliura—a prominent Ukrainian nationalist political and military leader during the 
independence struggle of the late 1910s and early 1920s.  
29 Yekelchyk, Stalin’s Empire of Memory, 3-12, 50; Tillet, The Great Friendship, 7; and Velychenko, 
Shaping Identity, 135-89.  The final version of the Friendship of the Peoples myth included the belief in a 
primordial East Slavic oneness extending back to the early Middle Ages.  Soviet historians thus posited the 
existence of a sixth-century “East Slavic political union,” situated in the province of Volhynia and 
comprised of the tribal ancestors of the modern Ukrainian, Belarusian, and Great Russian nations. 
Alexander Vucinich, “The First Russian State,” in Cyril E. Black, ed. Rewriting Russian History: Soviet 
Interpretations of Russia’s Past (New York: Vintage Books), 123-40.  
justice and slandering the Soviet Union in the refugee camps.30  Since Soviet discourse identified 
Ukrainian nationalism with Nazism, the latter’s rout implied the former’s as well.31  These articles 
simply ignored the fact that tens of thousands of Ukrainian nationalists were still in West Ukraine, 
bitterly struggling against Soviet authorities.  The representation of the OUN as an exclusively 
foreign problem that corrupted former Soviet citizens with the aid of “imperialist” governments 
became the standard interpretation thereafter.  
 After the pacification of the UPA in the early 1950s, discussions of the OUN in the press 
typically cropped up in the context of Soviet proselytization among the Ukrainian diaspora.  A 
1954 press conference in Kiev for repatriating Ukrainian emigre Iosif Krutii established an 
oblichenie-like ritual for this purpose.  At the press conference, Krutii opened the public 
confession of his sordid past among Ukrainian nationalist circles abroad with a disclaimer: 
 On May 9, in the emigrant, anti-Soviet newspaper ‘The Ukrainian Independent,” which is 
 published in West Germany, an essay has appeared about my alleged ‘kidnapping.’  It is 
 trying, in advance, to impress the idea upon its readers that any possible speeches of mine 
 should be regarded as fiction.  This assertion is utterly false, as, indeed, is everyone who 
 writes in this rag, published with American money.  No one ‘kidnapped’ me, but I want to 
 tell the reasons for my break with the Ukrainian nationalists in the present article.32  
Krutii indicts the OUN, claiming to have been a longtime member and supporter of various 
“Ukrainian nationalist circles.”  He had never joined the OUN, but had witnessed its evils 
firsthand.  After trotting out the obligatory accusations of wartime collaboration with Nazism, 
Krutii discussed the insidious, anti-Soviet activities of Ukrainian nationalists abroad.  He 
condemned Stepan Bandera, Andriy Melnyk, and Taras Borovets 33 as traitors who had sold 
10
30 “Pervaia sessiia General’noi Asamblei organizatsii Obedinennykh natsii: Vystuplenie M. Bazhana na 
zasedanii Komiteta No. 3,” Izvestiia [Moscow], February 2, 1946, and “O mezhdunarodnoi organizatsii po 
delam bezhentsev: Rech’ A. Ia. Vyshinskogo na zasedanii 3-go komiteta General’noi Asamblei 6 noiabria 
1946 g.,” Pravda [Moscow], November 8, 1946. 
31 Following this line, an 1948 historical article article depicted the OUN in interwar Poland as a 
subversive, Nazi-led operation.  M. Boguslavskii, “Politicheskaia bor’ba v Pol’she v sviazi s nastupleniem 
fashistkikh agressorov na Chekhoslovakiiu,” Voprosy istorii 5 (May 1948): 20-39.   
32 I. Krutii, “O prichinakh moego razryva s ukrainskimi natsionalistami,” Pravda [Moscow], May 19, 1954.
33 Stepan Bandera was the wartime leader of the OUN faction, called the OUN-B, that created the UPA; 
Andryiy Melnyk, the leader of the OUN-“M” faction that opposed Bandera’s.  Taras Borovets was military 
commander of the original Ukrainian People’s Revolutionary Army (formerly known as the Ukrainian 
Insurgent Army, but not to be confused with UPA), which existed from 1941 and fought German, Polish, 
Soviet, and OUN-B formations. 
themselves into the service of the imperialist West’s spy and propaganda bodies for personal 
enrichment.  Krutii coupled every charge against the nationalists with the assertion that the 
blameless Ukrainian nation had nothing to do with such traitors:  
 In reality, the Ukrainian people do not show any kind of support for the Ukrainian 
 nationalists . . .  My many-year experience with the Ukrainian emigration gives me the 
 right to say that the Ukrainian people never supported the banditry of the Ukrainian 
 nationalists.  All the talk about the ‘resistance movement’ in the Ukraine is a deception 
 behind which the leaders of the Ukrainian nationalists hide their dirty work against the 
 Ukrainian people, trying to involve ordinary emigrant-Ukrainians in this adventurism.34  
Everything about the “OUNites” (ounovtsy), apart from their titular nationality, was foreign to the 
people of Soviet Ukraine.  Krutii boiled down the OUN leadership’s motives to pure greed, 
accusing them of accepting bribes (invariably denominated in U.S. currency) in exchange for 
anti-Soviet intelligence gathering, “ideological subversion,” and drug smuggling.  He then cited 
the cultural and economic advances that Soviet rule had brought to Ukraine, whose people never 
desired to “turn their motherland into a colony of American and other capitalists.”35  
 The postwar Soviet mythos determined the details of Krutii’s salvation.  According to the 
article, he had decided to return to the motherland on Victory Day.  As we have seen, the Great 
Patriotic War separated the chosen from the damned.36  If there was any day to become a born-
again Soviet citizen, it was the ninth of May.  Pravda presented Krutii’s autobiographical 
confession as evidence of the regime’s magnanimity and leniency to those who had strayed from 
the herd.  Krutii’s tale of conversion concludes with the peculiar claim that he had made his 
decision to return to the Soviet fold only after having learned that Alexander Trushnovich—a 
leading figure in the National Alliance of Russian Solidarists (NTS)37—had defected from the 




36 Weiner, Making Sense of War, 82-126.
37 NTS was a far rightwing, anticommunist organization comprised of White émigrés with which Soviet 
propaganda frequently associated the OUN.  Despite its use of the Trident of St. Volodomyr, the NTS 
radically opposed Ukraine’s severance from Russia in accordance with its neoimperialist, Russophile 
ideology. 
put an end to all of my vacillations,” Krutii declared.  “I finally broke with the Ukrainian 
nationalists and moved to the side of the socialist camp.  I want to devote the rest of my life to 
work for the good of my people.”  The light of Soviet socialism had wrested Krutii from the 
clutches of the darkness.  Yet, the KGB had kidnapped Trushnovich the preceding April as a part 
of their ongoing secret operations against the NTS.38  As an alleged sympathizer of Ukrainian 
nationalism, the notion that Krutii would have been swayed by the example of the anti-Ukrainian 
nationalist Trushnovich’s “voluntary transfer” is dubious, not least of all because Trushnovich’s 
“transfer” had not been “voluntary.”    It is also unlikely that the Soviet state would have granted 
Krutii the amnesty implied by the article had he ever been a fully fledged member of the 
irredeemable OUN.  
 A year later, in 1955, as the Soviet Union fashioned a new, post-Stalinist image and 
welcomed back its former citizens through the “Committee for Return to the Motherland,” the 
press made it clear that such invitations did not apply to the “banderites.”  One article, published 
in Izvestiia, accused the OUN of exploiting, deceiving, and corrupting otherwise innocent or 
salvageable Ukrainian emigrants.  The piece reassured the latter:  “To all who declare their wish 
to return to the motherland and do this with an open heart, breaking with their emigrant past, 
there is nothing to fear.  The motherland will accept them and arrange a future life for them.”39  
Instead of offering associates of the OUN new lives, the regime busied itself with ending their old 
ones: Bogdan Stashinsky, a KGB operative, assassinated Lev Rebet40 and Stepan Bandera in 1957 
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June 30, 1941.  Served briefly as prime minister after Stetsko’s arrest by the Nazis.  He remained active in 
the OUN(B) abroad after the war.
and 1959, respectively.41  The KGB’s level of commitment to executing leading Ukrainian 
nationalists who had fled to the West reflected the Soviet polity’s understanding of itself as the 
champion of a higher standard of justice, particularly with regard to alleged war criminals and 
traitors.42  A 1960 article in Pravda—“L’vov Accuses: Oberlender Must Answer for his 
Crimes”—underscored the aspect of the Great Patriotic War myth which, in contrast to the 
prevailing attitude in Western countries, regarded collaboration as utterly unforgivable.43  
“Criminals have short memory,” the article declares, “but L’vov remembers!”  In the “name of 
L’vov and of the entire Soviet people,” the authors demand that Theodore Oberlender be brought 
to justice for his time at the head of the ethnically Ukrainian Wehrmacht battalion, “Nachtigall.”  
In the capitalist West, the article asserts, justice is hypocritical and incomplete.  The 
“imperialists” had granted amnesty to Nazi war criminals like Oberlender, and they had pardoned 
the Nazis’ “bourgeois-Ukrainian nationalist” henchmen along with them.  Such leniency was 
impossible in the postwar Soviet mythos.  
 Following the formula of Krutii’s case, Izvestiia ran a piece entitled “Lost Illusions,” 
which covered a press conference in Kiev concerning yet another Ukrainian nationalist’s 
confession and “voluntary” return to the motherland.  This time, however, the article made no 
insinuations about the amnesty and redemptive penance of the accused.  The readers of the 
newspaper were to believe that Dzhugalo Kazimir, a member of the OUN since the Great 
Patriotic War, had freely thrown himself at the mercy of the Soviet state and given up the names 
of numerous OUN agents in the service of the Bundesnachrichtendienst (a West German 
intelligence agency) and the CIA.  Kazimir’s carefully worded statement again made a clear 
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Pravda [Moscow], April 7, 1960.  
distinction between the OUN leadership, which acted in the name only of greed, and the poor 
Ukrainian emigrants who had been duped into supporting them.  “With full responsibility and 
knowledge of the issues, I can state that the leaders of the OUN in their dark deeds were 
concerned only with gathering money from drugged Ukrainian emigrants to build their own 
personal wealth.”44  The newspapers did not report on the trial that followed Kazimir’s return, but 
he expressed his utmost confidence in the superior justice offered by Soviet society.  “Whatever 
awaits me here [in Soviet Ukraine], I do not regret the decision [to return].  It is better to answer 
before a Soviet court than to enjoy the notorious ‘freedom’ of the western world.”  “Dzhugalo’s 
statement,” the article concludes, “has again shown the hideous face of the Ukrainian nationalist 
rump, situated in the service of imperialist intelligence.”  In contrast to Krutii’s story, Kazimir’s 
was about indictment and punishment, not forgiveness and salvation, which were out of the 
question thanks to his past involvement in the OUN.      
 Soviet discourse understood the OUN as a wartime extension of Nazism and a cancerous 
“fifth column” of eternal class enemies, conceptually segregating it from the blameless “Great 
Ukrainian people.”  Since the OUN/UPA’s nationality could not be denied outright, however, 
Soviet literature emphasized its purportedly “bourgeois” social origins.  One of the very few 
mentions of the UPA between 1953 and 1985 on the pages of the main Soviet professional 
historical journal, Voprosy istorii (Problems of History), conceded that the Nazis had “found some 
social support” on the territory of the Soviet Union, but only among “the exploiting classes of the 
western regions of Ukraine and Belarus who had been offended by Soviet power.”45  The 
difficulty of stripping the OUN/UPA of its Ukrainian ethnicity in order to preserve, untarnished, 
the innocence of the Ukrainian people as a whole necessitated the tedious repetition of the full, 
14
44 A. Kozlov, “Utrachenie iliuzii: Ukrainskoe natsionalisticheskoe okhvost’e na sluzhbe inostrannykh 
razvedok,” Izvestiia [Moscow], April 20, 1966.  The same day, Pravda published an article (“Ukrainskoe 
natsionalisticheskoe okhvost’e na sluzhbe inostrannykh razvedok”) on the same subject, making the same 
points and drawing the same conclusions.
45 Latvian, Estonian, and Lithuanian nationalists were similarly condemned.  However, the ongoing 
resistance of these groups and the UPA after 1945 are passed over in silence.  “Sovetskie organy 
gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti v gody Velikoi otechestvennoi voiny,” Voprosy istorii 5 (May 1965): 20-39.
politically correct epithet: “Ukrainian bourgeois nationalist.”46  In theory (and only in theory), the 
regime roundly absolved the Ukrainian peasantry and industrial proletariat of any culpability vis-
à-vis the OUN/UPA.  Thus, where the black mark of collaboration with Nazism did not suffice in 
the ostracization of the OUN/UPA from the Ukrainian people, Soviet propaganda introduced an 
inalienable class enmity as a supplementary charge. 
 Soviet visual arts carried the excommunication of the UPA into the 1970s, during which 
two films appeared addressing the UPA’s activities in West Ukraine after the Nazi occupation.  
The first, The White Bird with the Black Mark (Belaia ptitsa s chernoi otmetinoi), premiered in 
1971 at the Moscow International Film Festival, where it won first prize.47  It depicts a Hutsul 
family of musicians on the Ukrainian border with Romania.  There are three sons, two of whom 
join the Red Army while one joins the “bandits.”  The film never refers to the latter as “UPA,” 
“banderites,” or even “nationalists,” but the Soviet audience understood them as such.48  The 
White Bird with the Black Mark depicts the Uniate clergy and the “bandits” as mentally disturbed 
antisocials, draped in black garb, cloistered away in caves or monasteries, and divorced from the 
productive, communal life of the village.  The nationalist son of the family murders his own 
brother and another Red Army soldier (whose newlywed wife he had stolen during the war).  In 
the end, the village responds to the accusation of the third, Communist brother, and collectively 
executes the film’s traitor.  
 Prima facie, the film should have met the contemporary requirements of anti-OUN/UPA 
Soviet propaganda, but shortly after The White Bird with the Black Mark premiered, Soviet 
authorities pulled it from the shelves and banned it from further circulation.  Their overarching 
discursive strategy toward the memory of the OUN/UPA warranted this censorship of the film, 
which was at variance with the Soviet polity’s postwar mythology.  The White Bird with the Black 
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47 Belaia ptitsa s chernoi otmetinoi, directed by Yuri Illenko, Dovzhenko kinostudiia, 1971; and A. 
Karaganov, “Pravda zhizni narodnoi,” Pravda [Moscow], August 3, 1971.
48 As evidenced by the references to the “UPA” in the review of the 1971 International Film Festival.  Ibid.
Mark depicts the UPA as acting independently of the Nazis, recruiting among the Ukrainian 
peasantry within Communist families.  The film’s colors, symbolism, and plot make the darkness, 
irredeemability, and evil of “Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism” clear, but it excessively humanizes 
its chief villain as the black sheep in a good family rather than an unmasked impostor.  On the 
screen and in print, depictions of the UPA doing anything other than harming innocent Soviet 
citizens under the command of German fascists were de facto prohibited, but The White Bird with 
the Black Mark shows young UPA members in love, dancing to Hutsul folk music.  Scenes like 
these came dangerously close to romanticizing the UPA in conjunction with Ukrainian-Hutsul 
culture, belying the dictum of Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism’s alienness to the Ukrainian 
people.  Ultimately, the “black mark” of the OUN/UPA shined altogether too brightly in director 
Yuri Illenko’s retelling.49    
 Premiering in 1980, a second feature, Crimson Shores (Bagrianye berega)50 was not 
banned from viewing in the Soviet Union because it represented the official version of the UPA’s 
history with moral and aesthetic clarity.  Crimson Shores takes place in a West Ukrainian village 
after the war.  At the film’s outset, the victorious frontoviki— Red Army soldiers who had served 
on the front of the Second World War—happily return home to build a new life.  The hero of the 
film, a Red Army engineer, leads the village in the reconstruction of a bridge that had been 
destroyed during the war.  The bridge represents “proletarian internationalism,” the mythic bond 
between Russia and West Ukraine, and the rapid material progress of socialist reconstruction.  
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“Geroicheskaia kinoletopis’,” Izvestiia [Moscow], April 4, 1980.
Having built the bridge, however, the village loses it to the arson of UPA bandits the following 
night.  
 In contrast to The White Bird with the Black Mark, the “bandits” in Crimson Shores are a 
trio of petty saboteurs with no redeeming or humanizing characteristics and no sympathizers 
among people in the village.  Several marks distinguish the impostors from among the population 
before they are discovered: unlike the frontoviki, the bandits are few, dressed in black, and make a 
conspicuous point of using the customary Ukrainian greeting, “den’ dobrii,” in response to the 
Russian “zdravstvuite” offered by the film’s patriotic Soviet protagonist.  The village rebuilds the 
bridge and the bandits burn it down once again, but this time they attempt to murder the hero’s 
father in the process.  The father survives and bears witness against the bandits, whom the 
authorities gun down.  In the end, cornered by the film’s hero, the leader of the bandits falls to his 
death off of the demolished bridge, a victim of his own “antipeople” crimes and beliefs.  Crimson 
Shores’s decidedly pedestrian symbolism and plot conveyed a much clearer message than The 
White Bird with the Black Mark: the Great Patriotic War had exposed the UPA as unforgivable 
tormenters of the Soviet people, but the virtuous Red Army would avenge them and destroy the 
nationalist outsiders once and for all.  
 Soviet newspapers and films from the 1950s through the 1970s relegated the bulk of the 
UPA’s history in West Ukraine to society’s collective subconsciousness.  The few aspects of the 
UPA upon which Soviet discourse deigned to throw light implicated foreign powers and “enemy 
classes” only as culprits.51  In cinema, UPA members appeared as shadowy figures, hidden away 
in murky forests and pitch-black caves.  The Soviet press presented the “Ukrainian people” at 
home and in the diaspora as united in solidarity with the Russian nation against the OUN/UPA.  
In sum, the sources surveyed here employed a common set of terms and symbols, and pursued 
four aims: 1) to distinguish the essentially innocent if misguided Ukrainian émigré community as 
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a whole from the unforgivable OUN leadership; 2) to treat the presence of the OUN in foreign 
spy networks as a continuation of the “antipeople” activities it began during its collaboration with 
the Nazis; 3) to reduce the motivations of Ukrainian nationalists to the basest greed for material 
wealth; and 4) to attribute ultimate blame for the OUN/UPA’s treachery to non-Ukrainian and 
non-Soviet powers.  
“We Have No Right to Forget!”
 The elderly members of the Politburo gathered for the Twenty-sixth Congress of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union from February 23 to March 3, 1981.   Leonid Brezhnev 
presided over the congregation, delivering lengthy speeches to the assembled Soviet elite.  The 
preceding months had brought a series of disturbing developments.  The birth and expansion of 
the Solidarity trade union in Poland threatened the Party with a populist, Catholic, anti-Soviet 
social movement that brazenly supported Ukraine’s national independence from Moscow.52  
Brezhnev argued that what was happening in Poland represented a classic case of “imperialist 
ideological subversion” exploiting internal mistakes that the regime had made by letting its guard 
down.  Ronald Reagan, a figure greatly maligned in official Soviet circles at the time, had won 
the U.S. presidential election and assumed office.  Brezhnev claimed that Reagan (like his 
predecessor, Jimmy Carter) was exacerbating relations between the two powers with bellicose 
rhetoric and an anti-Communist attitude.  Alertness against an evermore determined and clever 
enemy was the order of the day.  “Our class enemies take lessons from their defeats,” the 
congress’s resolutions warned.  “Their actions against the countries of socialism are more refined 
and insidious.”53  
 After the Twenty-sixth Party Congress, the quantity and quality of Soviet materials 
dealing with the OUN/UPA greatly increased as state publishing houses distributed volumes 
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devoted to the subject in large press runs.54  Incriminating materials culled from the KGB’s 
archives were publicized to further demonize the Ukrainian nationalists.  The regime also 
communicated its anti-OUN/UPA message to the non-Soviet world.55  This new publishing 
activity reflected the regime’s heightened anxieties about “imperialist” efforts to exploit national 
separatist sentiments within the Soviet sphere of influence.56  
 Following Brezhnev’s death in 1982, the Communist Party’s propaganda machine 
intensified the campaign against “Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism” under the direction of Yuri 
Andropov.57  Andropov exerted a significant influence upon Soviet politics and discourse during 
his time as General Secretary between 1982 and 1984.  His previous career makes the redoubling 
of antinationalist propaganda that occurred on his watch unsurprising.  The character and content 
of the regime’s obloquies against the OUN/UPA matched Andropov’s dread of national dissent.  
He had served as the ambassador to Hungary in 1956, where, according to his colleagues, he 
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developed a phobia of antistate mass movements.58   As chairman of the KGB, Andropov played a 
prominent role in the crushing of the Prague Spring and the suppression of Solidarity.  Andropov 
resigned from his post as head of the KGB in May 1982, shortly after succeeding the “unofficial 
chief ideologue of the Party,” Mikhail Suslov, as Second Secretary of the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union.  Andropov’s professional obsession with foreign conspiracies aimed at 
undermining the Soviet Union’s multinational unity from within using “ideological subversion” is 
readily evident in his activities, speeches, and writings.59     
 The behavior of President Ronald Reagan (in office 1981-1989) seemed to validate these 
fears.  In particular, the friendliness of the Reagan administration with émigré Ukrainian 
nationalist organizations strained Soviet-US relations.  Soviet propaganda seized upon the evident 
closeness of the OUN to the American leadership as further proof of the great, antinarodnyi 
conspiracy afoot.  Soviet journalists seldom missed an opportunity to call attention to the West’s 
own self-incriminations: 
 In the U.S., a book has been published by the brothers Scott and John Lee Anderson, 
 Inside  the League, which narrates the activities of the so-called ‘World Anti-Communist 
 League,’ in which former banderites—members of the Organization of Ukrainian 
 Nationalists—actively participate.  The banderites were taken prisoner by the British and 
 the Americans after the war and used for anti-Soviet activities, and the OUN formed their 
 “representation” on U.S. territory with funds of the American government, the book says.  
 The connection of the OUNites with U.S. government circles is drawn.  ‘The White 
 House nationalists find the closest ally in Ronald Reagan,’ write the brothers Anderson.  
 For example, three years ago, one of the leaders of the OUN, Iaroslav Stetsko, was 
 welcomed at the White House and photographed ‘in memory,’ with the U.S. President.60  
20
58 According to KGB defector V. Mitrokhin (a tendentious source), it was the opinion of Andropov’s 
comrades in the KGB that the man suffered from the “Hungarian syndrome.”  Andrew and Mitrokhin, The 
Sword and the Shield, 5-6.
59 Like the propaganda produced under his secretaryship, Zionist conspiracies, the Friendship of the 
Peoples, and Soviet patriotism are definite motifs in Andropov’s oeuvre.  See, for example, Y. V. Andropov, 
“The Friendship of Soviet Nations -- The Inexhaustible Source of Our Victories,” and “Ideological 
Subversion -- The Poisoned Weapon of Imperialism,” in Speeches and Writings (New York: Pergamon 
Press, 1983), 110-23, 190-98.
60 “Mneniia i nabliudeniia,” Argumenty i fakty [Moscow], June 10, 1986.
Reagan’s 1982 “Crusade for Freedom” speech61 and cooperation with figures like Stetsko 
alarmed official Soviet circles that the U.S. and the OUN would take advantage of the instability 
caused by Solidarity to intensify “ideological subversion” within the USSR.  
 In the Ukrainian diaspora, the World Congress of Free Ukrainians (WCFU) continued 
efforts begun at its founding in 1967 to unite organizations such as the Ukrainian Congress 
Committee of America, the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, the Ukrainian Canadian 
Committee and dozens of others under a single umbrella.  Deep ideological rifts in the Ukrainian 
community stemming from conflicts among the rival factions of the OUN ultimately made this 
impossible, but the 1978 Third World Congress of Free Ukrainians in New York City, brought 
enough attention to their collective indictment of the Soviet Union for human rights abuses and 
colonial Russification to provoke a Soviet response.  Soviet statements insisted the WCFU was 
nothing more than a nuisance—a mere handful of neo-Nazis and anti-Semites—but the energy 
they devoted to discrediting the congress suggested, on the contrary, that they took it rather 
seriously.62  
 The government broadcasted warnings about the insidious activities of the OUN among 
the Soviet people while nonchalantly boasting about the incorruptibility of Soviet citizens.  One 
story, widely publicized by the press, concerned a CIA-backed attempt by the OUN and the ABN 
to recruit Mikhailo Kukhtiak, a doctor from the West Ukrainian city of Ivano-Frankivsk.  
Kukhtiak’s brief, amateur career as a double-agent in the OUN made the man an overnight 
exemplar of the patriotic Soviet citizen.  The official story began when OUN-affiliated family 
members of Kukhtiak visited him from Canada and expressed great interest in the “negative 
aspects” of Soviet society in Ukraine and “unrecognized geniuses” (i.e. dissident voices).  
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Kukhtiak’s passive, “yes-man” attitude toward their advances mistakenly convinced the OUN 
leadership abroad that he had become one of their adherents.  Having realized that the OUN was 
attempting to draw him into anti-Soviet activities, Kukhtiak, like a good citizen, reported the 
situation to the appropriate authorities, which decided to use him to infiltrate the OUN/ABN and 
gather compromising information about them.  Kukhtiak became Iaroslav Stetsko’s “man in 
Ukraine,” a contact for smugglers of American money and “slanderous literature” into the USSR.  
After Kukhtiak had finished his duty, the state arranged a press conference for him to relate his 
experiences and enjoy a spot in the sun for his stolid rebuke of these “hostile, anti-Soviet 
schemes.”  Soviet coverage of the story alleged that the OUN/ABN aimed to “exploit the 
situation in Poland” and corrupt Ukrainian youth with the “infection of nationalism.”  The 
pamphlets and articles that conveyed Kukhtiak’s story pointedly defined the OUN’s original sin 
as wartime collaboration.  What one had done during the war continued to determine one’s 
virtuousness.63  
 Originally, the postwar Soviet mythos regarded wartime guilt as hereditary, but beginning 
in the 1980s the claim entered the discourse that Communist countries would magnanimously 
absolve younger, OUN-affiliated Ukrainians who had not participated in the war of the sins of 
their fathers.  The Soviet metanarrative did not, however, erase the black mark against the 
“bourgeois nationalist” fathers (and mothers) who had resisted the sovietization of West Ukraine.  
An invocation of war crimes invariably accompanied any reference to the OUN in Soviet 
discourse.  The coverage of Kukhtiak’s press conference, for instance, accused the OUN of 
participation in the perpetration of the massacre at Babi Yar64 (quietly omitting the fact that the 
Nazis had also killed more than six hundred OUN members there).  When it came to indignation 
about the abortion of justice that the Western world’s general amnesty for OUN/UPA 
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Between 100,000 and 150,000 Jews, Romani, Ukrainian nationalists and others were murdered at the site. 
“collaborators” represented, Soviet propaganda singled out Stetsko (said to be living off of U.S. 
“taxpayer money” provided to him by the Reagan administration) for special invective: “Stetsko 
lives quietly in Germany.  Why does he go unpunished as a war criminal?  Because the Western 
intelligence services, and especially the CIA, can rely upon no one else in their ‘crusade’ against 
Communism, because only traitors of Stetsko’s type are prepared to defile their own people for 
the silver pieces of a Judas.”65  For all of its sensationalism, Soviet propaganda portrayed Stetsko 
and the rest of the OUN/ABN leadership as irrelevant anachronisms with delusions of grandeur, 
completely incapable of doing real harm to the invincible Soviet people.  Despite the danger that 
these foreign enemies allegedly posed, the Soviet discourse of the early 1980s ridiculed their 
“subversive activities” as the farcical repetition of the wartime tragedy to which they had 
contributed.66 
 But while the Soviet metanarrative emphasized the weakness of the aging population of 
UPA veterans in the face of the united, ever vigilant Soviet people, it did not acknowledge their 
humanity.  The KGB’s heavy censorship of The High Pass (Visokii Pereval), a 1981 film by 
Ukrainian director Aleksander Denisenko, underscored the regime’s unwillingness to tolerate a 
rapprochement between the Soviet and Ukrainian nationalist mythologies.67  The High Pass tells 
the story of a Communist woman returning home from the front in the Great Patriotic War only to 
find that her husband and children have joined the “banderites.”  According to an interview with 
his son (a contemporary Ukrainian author) Denisenko had originally intended the film to present 
both UPA supporters and Communist officials as everyday people with their own tragedies, 
dreams, and values.  Censors found Denisenko’s vision unacceptable.  The KGB forced the 
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67 Visokii Pereval, directed by Aleksandr Denisenko, Dovzhenko Film Studios, 1981.  http://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=W7V0MIMZUf4&feature=related [Accessed November 21, 2011].
deletion of a battle scene depicting the UPA as a large military force, comprised of common 
Ukrainians, engaged in open combat with Soviet soldiers.  This scene and others that contradicted 
the Soviet metanarrative by depicting the UPA as a popular movement among Ukrainians 
independent from Nazism never saw the light of day.  Instead, the final version of The High Pass 
offered the customary portrayal of OUNites as a paltry gang of one-dimensional villains.  The 
KGB blocked Denisenko’s attempt to modify the Soviet war myth with the introduction of a third, 
distinctly Ukrainian force.68  The postwar Soviet mythos could not accommodate memories of the 
UPA as anything other than irredeemable Nazi collaborators.  
 The original version of Denisenko’s film had committed the sin of preserving the 
“Ukrainianness” and humanity of the UPA.  The version that ultimately premiered before Soviet 
audiences at the Fifteenth All-Union Film Festival in Tallinn (1982) was guilty of no such 
heresies.  Reviews of The High Pass couched their discussions of the film’s meaning and merit in 
terms drawn directly from the postwar Soviet metanarrative.  
 Such is the priceless wealth and friendship of our peoples, cemented by blood in the 
 struggle against the enemies of the socialist fatherland, and then in the labor for the 
 building of a mighty socialist power,  revealed to us on the screen of the All-Union 
 Film Festival. . . . [The High Pass] is about the struggle against nationalism, against the 
 banderites, who were on the direct path to the betrayal of the people.69
The fate of Denisenko’s film demonstrated that only a denationalized UPA would be tolerated in 
the Soviet metanarrative.  If the UPA could not be exported, then it could not be consumed 
either. 
 Late Soviet propaganda carried out the denationalization of the OUN/UPA in synch with 
the externalization and de-Sovietization of other groups, especially Jews.  According to the logic 
of postwar Soviet antisemitism, nature trumped nurture.  Jewishness eo ipso called one’s political 
reliability into question.  The accepted if unspoken belief that Jews, unlike Ukrainians and other 
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69 G. Gukasov and V. Novikov, “Shirokii ekran festivalia,” Izvestiia [Moscow], April 15, 1982.
Slavs, did not constitute a fully fledged Soviet nationality, had not served bravely during the 
Great Patriotic War, and possessed no legitimate claims to unique, collective suffering at the 
hands of the Nazi invaders continued to influence official Soviet attitudes in the 1980s.  Jews also 
provided a convenient scapegoat for the postwar Communist world’s chronic social and economic 
problems.  They could be assimilated (i.e. “de-Judaicized”) into the “Soviet people,” in which 
case they still risked discrimination, or they could join nations inherently at odds with the Soviet 
Union (e.g. Israel or the USA), but in either case their underlying nature was suspect, alien.70  
They embodied, in other words, the very qualities that Soviet ideologues hoped to impute to the 
OUN/UPA.   
 One monograph in particular, Anticommunist Alliance: A Critique of the Ideological and 
Sociopolitical Doctrines of International Zionism and Ukrainian Bourgeois Nationalism, 
attempted to extend this opprobrium against Jews to the OUN/UPA.71  Anticommunist Alliance 
equates and polemicizes the “antihuman” political ideologies and tactics of “international 
Zionism” and “Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism.”  In fealty to the dictums of Leninism, the book 
pays lip service to the “class-enemy character” of Zionism, but the phrase “bourgeois Zionism” 
never became the endlessly repeated formula in Bolshevik argot that the phrase “Ukrainian 
bourgeois nationalism” did.  Instead, following Soviet convention, Anticommunist Alliance 
repetitively refers to Zionism as an “international” phenomenon (mezhdunarodnii sionizm), 
because Zionism’s allegedly bourgeois character was unimportant compared to its racial and 
cultural content, which postwar Soviet discourse had no qualms about defaming.  The opposite 
was the case with regard to Ukrainian nationalism, which Soviet propaganda attacked only on the 
basis of social and economic terms in order to reaffirm the idea that OUN/UPA bore no relation to 
the pure Ukrainian ethnos, of which only the “toiling classes” could rightfully claim to be a part.  
Writing at this time, Soviet historian I. I. Rimarenko spins the alliance between “Ukrainian 
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bourgeois nationalism” and “international Zionism” as a wedding between two “antinational” 
extremes—“a synthesis of chauvinism and cosmopolitanism.”72  Whereas the “proletarian 
internationalist” position occupied the ideal middle ground, the OUN/UPA and its Zionist 
coconspirators flanked the Friendship of the Peoples from the left and the right: the former, by 
harboring an excess of “ethnic particularism”; the latter, with its “cosmopolitan” lack thereof.  
 Deflecting potential accusations of racism, Anticommunist Alliance accuses both 
“Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists” and “international Zionists” of the basest contempt for and 
disloyalty to the nations of which they illegitimately claim to be a part.  “Under the ‘alliance’ of 
international Zionism and Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism it is understood, moreover, that their 
commonality in the service of the imperialist bourgeoisie betrays the interest of ‘their own’ 
peoples.”  Rimarenko’s use of quotation marks here signifies his rejection of the notion that 
“international Zionists” and “Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists” belonged to any nation, or that 
they had anything but hatred for all nations.  Antisemitism, Rimarenko alleges, is the real basis of 
the working relationship between the two groups, both of which harbor “antipeople,” and 
“antinational” views.73  Rimarenko’s charge of misanthropic collusion with (and even 
“subservience to”) Zionism became a common refrain in a number of subsequent Soviet exposés 
of the OUN/UPA.74  Soviet discourse cast “international Zionism” as an occult, external foe and 
conjoined the OUN/UPA with it so that the latter could be attacked without antagonizing ethnic 
Ukrainians or offending their national feelings.  This “Judaicization” of the OUN/UPA served to 
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corroborate the mutually contradictory traits of nationlessness and treachery that Soviet 
propaganda simultaneously attributed to it.   
 Late Soviet discourse regarded religion and nationalism as two sides of the same 
“reactionary” coin.  Referring to a “Jewish journal” in Odessa called Rassvet (The Dawn), 
Rimarenko writes: “Anticommunism and anti-Sovietism form the political basis of the ‘alliance’ 
of Zionism and Judaism, [and] of Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism and religion. . . .  The Dawn 
has uncovered the essence of Zionism as a reaction to the dissemination of the idea of scientific 
Communism.”75  The postwar Soviet metanarrative conflated the OUN with the Ukrainian 
Catholic Uniate Church in the same way that it conflated Zionism with Judaism.  Other Soviet 
texts76 maintained that the OUNites possessed the same “reactionary worldview” and “socio-
psychological aspect” as the “clericalism” of the Uniate Church.  One widely circulated piece of 
Soviet propaganda, Criminal Alliance: On the Union of the Uniate Church and Ukrainian 
Bourgeois Nationalism, argues that the Uniates and the OUN shared the most backward 
antinauchnost’,77 and therefore opposed the liberation of the Ukrainian nation and the unity of the 
Soviet people.78  Postwar Soviet propaganda thus implicated the Uniate Church in the “pro-fascist 
banditry” of the UPA during and after the war.79  There were historical motives for this libelous 
assessment of the Uniate clergy.  In the course of pacifying the West Ukrainian and West 
Belarusian borderlands, the Stalinist authorities had brutally disbanded and “reunified” the 
Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church with the Russian Orthodox Church.  Historically and 
discursively, the excision of the UPA went hand-in-hand with the destruction of the Uniate 
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Church.80  In the Soviet mindset, the Uniates and the “banderites” were fellow travelers under the 
“black banner” of “international reaction,” beholden to Rome and Washington, the implacable 
enemies of all working people and of Soviet Ukrainians in particular.  In this way, the postwar 
Soviet metanarrative equated the Uniate Church and the OUN/UPA as pernicious manifestations 
of “antiscientific irrationalism” while adamantly de-Ukrainizing both through association with 
malevolent foreign plots.        
 The title of one Soviet book—Counterrevolution for Export: Ukrainian Bourgeois 
Nationalism in the Arsenal of Modern Anticommunism—unwittingly projected the Soviet 
metanarrative’s own treatment of the OUN/UPA onto the West.81  It was the Soviet Union, after 
all, which had “exported” its homegrown “counterrevolution” of “Ukrainian bourgeois 
nationalism” to the outside world—not the other way around.  Nevertheless, the book’s author, 
Soviet historian and specialist on Ukrainian nationalism V. P. Cherednichenko, argues that the 
imperialist West produced and exported “Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism” to the USSR through 
espionage and ideological subversion:   
 The facts set forth in this book, are a testimony that the so-called ‘third force,’ which the 
 Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists try to present themselves as, does not exist abroad.  The 
 foreign camp of bourgeois-nationalist counterrevolution is by no means a ‘national- 
 liberation movement.’  They present themselves as the faithful servants of the most 
 extreme reaction, henchmen of anticommunism, of antisovietism, obediently acting 
 exclusively in the interests of imperialism.  At the back of the Ukrainian bourgeois 
 nationalists stands the special services, the ideology and propaganda centers of 
 imperialism, striving to slow down the positive processes in international life, to excite 
 the arms race and revive the atmosphere of the ‘Cold War.’  And this too is an illustration 
 of the fact that bourgeois nationalists are the executors of a foreign will, of the 
 instructions and precepts of foreigners.82   
Under the influence of the strict dualism of the Soviet metanarrative, Cherednichenko rejects the 
OUN/UPA’s claim to the status of a “third force”—a force opposed to both Communism and 
Nazism.  Soviet discourse denied agency and autonomy to the OUN/UPA, to which it attributed 
the traits of whatever anti-Soviet power happened to be most salient at the time.  By casting the 
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OUN/UPA as mindless saboteurs and killers at the beck and call of foreign masters, Soviet 
propaganda further dehumanized them.  This helped to absolve the Soviet system and the 
Ukrainian nation of responsibility for the OUN/UPA.  It was a truism of the Soviet mythos that 
every genuine Soviet Ukrainian was a free, conscientious, and morally pure human being.  Soviet 
discourse’s attempt to demonstrate that unfree, unconscientious, and morally corrupted 
“antipeople” comprised the OUN/UPA was, therefore, another aspect of its denationalization of 
them.  Soviet Ukraine had given birth to no monsters, but the “imperialist” Ahriman had 
deformed the raw material of merely potential Soviet Ukrainians, filling so many empty vessels 
with the depravities of anticommunism.  Fortunately, concludes Cherednichenko, the eternally 
united members of the Soviet people suffered from no such defects: 
 The subversive attempts of the organizers and executors of psychological war . . . [are] 
 opposed by the  invincible oneness of the Soviet people, its monolithic cohesion around 
 the Communist Party, the friendship of the peoples, the patriotism and internationalism of 
 Soviet people, [and] their highest political vigilance, uncompromisingness toward the 
 enemy’s views, [and] ability to give a worthy rebuke to the ideological subversion 
 of the class enemy.83 
The mythic Soviet community, sealed in blood through the redemptive carnage of the Great 
Patriotic War, could never be compromised by outsiders such as the OUN/UPA, because this 
would have entailed an impossible circumvention of the “laws of historical development” 
enshrined in the Soviet metanarrative.  But if the Soviet community were to resist the evil 
temptations of “Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism,” then it had “no right to forget” the things that 
supposedly made the OUN/UPA so execrable in the first place.   
 Once it had been acknowledged that the aberration of the OUN/UPA in the Soviet mythos 
could not be excised through forgetting, the Soviet strategy shifted toward excision through 
remembering, but continued to employ the same rhetorical devices and didactic tropes in a 
stepped-up anti-OUN/UPA campaign in the 1980s, of which Anticommunist Alliance, Criminal 
Alliance, and Counterrevolution for Export are three representative examples.  The scope of the 
Soviet polity’s officially sanctioned coverage of the OUN/UPA expanded substantially, but the 
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framework of the Soviet Union’s postwar foundational mythology continued to narrowly define 
acceptable content for works on this subject. The basic strategy of denationalizing the OUN/UPA 
by “exporting” it to foreign entities went unchanged, but the tactics used to execute it were 
multiplied.  In addition to the well worn accusations of collaboration with Nazi Germany and 
spying for the imperialist West, Soviet propaganda placed the OUN/UPA on the vanguard of an 
even larger anti-Communist conspiracy, which implicated Catholics, Polish nationalists, 
Trotskyites, U.S. leaders, and Zionists, among others, in the “antipeople” activities of the OUN/
UPA.  The association of the OUN/UPA with “Zionism” and “clericalism” reflected two major 
components of postwar Soviet political culture and ideology: antisemitism and anti-religiosity, 
respectively.  Amalgamating “Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism” with the “opiate of the masses” 
enabled Soviet authors to attribute the barbarity and darkness of religious antinauchnost’ to the 
OUN/UPA.  Amalgamating “Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism” with “international Zionism” 
enabled Soviet authors to attribute the purported alienness, rootlessness, criminality, and 
deceptiveness of Israel and the Jews to the OUN/UPA.  Soviet propaganda placed both of these 
alleged “alliances” under the umbrella of “imperialism,” ascribing a central role in the whole 
scheme to the USA, which menacingly touted its nuclear weapons.  The Soviet public was 
exposed to works averring the OUN/UPA’s synonymity, in essence, with “fascism,” 
“imperialism,” “Zionism,” and “clericalism.”  The same texts typically portrayed everyday Soviet 
Ukrainians as well informed, upstanding citizens whose vigilance, patriotism, and knowledge 
empowered them to identify the dangerous foreign agents in their midst and report them to the 
appropriate authorities.  The honest, educated, and firmly rooted Soviet Ukrainian’s 
incorruptibility continued to encapsulate the obverse of the “masked,” irrational, and derelict 
“banderite’s” irredeemability.   In accordance with the new orientation, Ukrainian-Russian author 
and publicist V. P. Beliaev84 declared the collective remembering of the OUN/UPA’s crimes as a 
solemn duty to the future: “Let the facts of history remind the people of those bourgeois 
30
84 Beliaev’s trilogy The Old Fortress (Staraia krepost’) won the Stalin Award in 1952.  He became a Soviet 
authority on the OUN/UPA in the late 1970s and early 1980s, drawing on alleged autobiographical 
experience of the insurgency for inspiration.
nationalists and Uniates, about whom we have no right to forget!  In the name of peace in our 
land!  In the name of justice and happiness!”85  After this volte-face, the Soviet citizenry had an 
obligation to know the UPA’s history, even if its politically or mythologically inconvenient details 
continued to be concealed from them.
Conclusion   
 Soviet society’s ablation of the Ukrainian nationalist insurgency was not merely physical, 
but discursive as well.  The dearth of published texts dealing with the OUN and the UPA during 
the postwar period is particularly evident in the central, Russophone press.  The moratorium on 
publications treating the UPA as a major episode in the Soviet Socialist Ukrainian Republic’s 
history began to change only in the late 1970s and early 1980s.   At this time, Soviet journalists, 
propagandists, and historians produced and published dozens of books, pamphlets, films, and 
articles dealing with the UPA, its origins in the OUN, its invariably foreign supporters and 
masters, its nihilistic ideology, and its pernicious postwar activities and defunct legacy.  
Nevertheless, the writers and filmmakers who addressed the subject of the OUN/UPA in the early 
1980s did so in accordance with the Party’s strict directives and controls, which prohibited their 
work from breaching the parameters of the Soviet polity’s calcified postwar mythology.  Despite 
the novelty and danger of the subject of the OUN/UPA in late Soviet discourse, the language, 
arguments, and symbols used to address it faithfully toed the Party line. 
 Changes in the programmatic content of officially sanctioned Soviet scholarship typically 
reflected the impact of political developments at higher levels of the party-state.   Thus the fact 
that Soviet historians, filmmakers, and publicists began to openly grapple with the UPA when 
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they did likely reflected new signals “from above.”86  Concurrent events seem to bear this 
hypothesis out.  The early 1980s witnessed a reintensification of Cold War rhetoric and 
heightened anxieties among the Soviet elite about the security of the Eastern Bloc nations and, by 
extension, the territorial integrity of the USSR.  Opponents of Soviet power in Poland 
(particularly those associated with Solidarity) and the USA supported nascent Ukrainian 
aspirations to full independence.87  It is no surprise, therefore, that the Party responded to these 
affronts with a renewed assault on the “fifth column” of “Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism.”  
However, this hypothesis explains only the timing of the new publishing activity.  Attributing the 
genesis of the anti-OUN/UPA propaganda campaign to the orders of the Party elite—even if this 
is essentially correct—pays insufficient attention the language used in these texts, which both 
prefigured and constituted the campaign itself.  Тhey were not simply pursuing and presenting the 
“truth,” but ritualistically repeating received truths, which, in turn, defined the boundaries of the 
conceivable and the expressible.88  Ultimately, the Soviet metanarrative permitted only 
incriminating memories about the OUN/UPA (of which there was no shortage to be found or 
fabricated) and carefully concealed the rest from the Russian public lest anything come to light 
that blatantly contradicted its chiliastic vision of history.  
 The question remains: Why did the OUN/UPA make such a sudden and dramatic (re)
appearance in Soviet discourse in the early 1980s?  Weiner attributes the propaganda campaign to 
32
86  On political control over Soviet historical research, see George M. Enteen, Tatiana Gorn, and C. A. 
Kern-Simirenko Soviet Historians and the Study of Russian Imperialism (University Park: Pennsylvania 
State University Press, 1979);  L. A. Sidorova, Ottepel’ v istoricheskoi nauke: Sovetskaiia istoriografiia 
pervogo poslestalinskogo desiatiletiia (Moscow: Pamiatniki istoricheskoi mysli, 1997); and, Alter L. 
Litvin, and John L. H Keep, Writing History in Twentieth-Century Russia: A View from Within (New York: 
Palgrave, 2001).
87 See, for example, Timothy Snyder, Sketches from a Secret War: A Polish Artist’s Mission to Liberate 
Soviet Ukraine (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005). 
88 In other words, they did not pray to the idols of Soviet civilization because they believed in them, but 
believed in them because they prayed to them.  Bearing in mind historian Gareth Stedman-Jones’s point 
that “we cannot decode political language to reach a primal and material expression of interest since it is 
the discursive structure of political language which conceives and defines interest in the first place,” these 
texts and their authors’ reasons for creating them are perhaps better understood as products of the all-
encompassing mythology endemic to late Soviet culture. Gareth Stedman-Jones, quoted in Igal Halfin, 
From Darkness to Light: Class, Consciousness, and Salvation in Revolutionary Russia (Pittsburgh: 
University of Pittsburgh Press, 2000), 11.
“persistent initiatives in western Ukraine to rehabilitate the OUN and UPA,”89 but this is only part  
of the story.  The stewards of the Soviet mythos had begun to sense the crisis facing them.  The 
party-state had failed to deliver on its ambitious promises of social and economic progress.  The 
danger of non-Communist apostasy among the Soviet citizenry had begun to rise.  Resurgent 
nationalisms among Russians and non-Russians chipped away at the Friendship of the Peoples 
myth.90  Soviet nations began developing their own, nationally exclusive myths of victimization 
and/or triumph in the Second World War (a privilege that the Soviet mythos had emphatically 
denied to the Jews).  All of this was occurring despite the Party’s efforts, intensified under 
Brezhnev, to hasten the “drawing-together” and ultimate “fusion” of the Soviet nationalities into a 
single Soviet nation, with a single history, language, and consciousness.91  In sum, “Stalin’s 
empire of memory” was disintegrating.  The anti-OUN/UPA propaganda campaign may thus have 
been a final act of desperation—an attempt to provide an empirical basis for the myths of the 
postwar Soviet metanarrative.92  
 Political motives for the exposure of the OUN/UPA abounded in the decade preceding 
perestroika, but the poverty of late Soviet discourse left it incapable of adapting to the new 
circumstances and revising the increasingly untenable Friendship of the Peoples myth.  Instead, 
the discourse sought to counteract the centrifugal pull of national identity politics by reasserting 
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every reason to feel anxious about the future viability of their worldview in the rapidly changing Soviet 
polity.  By the end of the decade, Gorbachev’s reforms had decisively and irreversibly undermined the 
secular religion of the Soviet party-state. The war myth outlived the Soviet Union.  The Friendship of the 
Peoples myth, by contrast, did not survive the collapse of the USSR, though it may be more accurate to say 
that the Soviet Union did not survive the collapse of the Friendship of the Peoples myth.  For a broader 
account of the implosion of the Soviet metanarrative, see Gill, Symbols and Legitimacy, 213-262.
old tropes.  Soviet propaganda’s reliance upon an evermore irrelevant mythology of international 
solidarity in the face of external opposition led it to employ the ad hoc, “no true Scotsman” 
argument described throughout this essay.  UPA veterans were “no true Ukrainians” because 
Ukrainians, by definition, were loyal to the Soviet state and their Russian brethren.  It was vital to 
the integrity of the Union that both Ukrainians and Russians believe this.  Among Soviet 
Ukrainians, the UPA posed a posthumous threat to the Soviet order as an alternative, antithetical 
mythology.  Seemingly resigned to the fact that Soviet Ukrainians would continue to remember 
the UPA’s postwar insurgency despite its failed policy of silence on the subject, the authorities 
decided to intervene in the remembering process with arguments and evidence designed to 
distance “real” Ukrainians from the purportedly anti-Ukrainian OUN/UPA.  By similarly 
reassuring Russians that the UPA did not sprout from genuinely Ukrainian blood and soil, Soviet 
discourse may have been attempting to prevent them from adopting divisive, Ukrainophobic 
attitudes, or taking inspiration from the OUN’s brand of mystical, voluntarist nationalism to form 
Russian-nationalist factions of their own.93   On both counts, Soviet efforts ultimately proved too 
little, too late.
 The presence of “Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism” in postwar Soviet society rendered 
the health of the body politic and its legitimating mythology dubious.  Late Soviet authors dealt 
with this predicament by programmatically reaffirming the postwar Soviet mythos in their 
polemics against the OUN/UPA.  This necessitated the denationalization of the UPA and its 
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93 Such concerns would not have been entirely unfounded.  A genre of neo-imperialist historical writing in 
post-Soviet Russia displays continuities with many of the arguments employed by the Soviet authors 
discussed above, including the notion that the OUN/UPA was artificially injected into Ukraine by 
international conspirators.  However, the writers of this ilk display a number a tendencies decidedly at 
variance with Soviet ideology.  They deny the existence of the Ukrainian nation altogether, and insist that 
“holy, indivisible Rus’” includes both Ukraine and Belarus and ought to be considered ethnically “Russian” 
and religiously “Orthodox.”  These authors believe that Soviet Communism, far from cementing the bond 
between ”Great Russians” (i.e. Russians) and “South Russians” (i.e. Ukrainians), egregiously undermined it 
with a godless, antinational state and ideology.  See, for example: Aleksandr Karevin, Rus’ nerusskaia: Kak 
rozhdalas’ "ridna mova" (Moscow: Imperskaia traditsiia, 2006);  S. N. Shchegolev, Istoriia "ukrainskogo" 
separatizma (Moscow: Imperskaia traditsiia, 2004); and Leonid Sokolov, Ostorozhno--"Ukrainstvo"! 
(Moscow: FondIV, 2009).  The intellectual antecedents of this strand of post-Soviet Russian hostility 
toward Ukraine and Ukrainian nationalism strategically situated themselves throughout late Soviet politics, 
and may well have caused concern among Soviet officials that a clandestine, OUN-like party might take 
root among Russians.  N. Mitrokhin, Russkaia partiia: Dvizhenie russkikh natsionalistov v SSSR: 
1953-1985 gody (Moscow: Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, 2003).   
“treachery” in accordance with the ideological impossibility of national antagonisms and popular 
anti-Communist sentiment in postwar Soviet society.  Insofar as one can be a traitor only to one’s 
own country or people, however, the denationalization of treachery entailed a contradiction, 
which Soviet propaganda mitigated by ridiculing and belittling the significance and extent of the 
OUN/UPA, and claiming that it did not represent the Ukrainian people.  Soviet works asserted 
that only small bands of petty criminals, opportunists, misanthropes, and the mentally ill 
comprised the UPA’s ranks and leadership, but the official treatment of “banderovshchina” as a 
grave, subversive threat requiring the utmost vigilance of the Soviet people to combat was at 
variance with this position as well.  
 Official Soviet discourse vigorously denied the OUN/UPA’s autochthony in West 
Ukraine, attributing all of the problems attending it to alien elements abroad.94  Communist 
writers averred, moreover, that there was nothing distinctively Ukrainian about the OUN/UPA’s 
ideology, aims, and methods, which they instead attributed to a cabal of non-Ukrainian puppet 
masters.  All the malevolent bedfellows imputed to the OUN/UPA in Soviet discourse were 
“foreign” (that is, non-Soviet and non-Ukrainian) and “reactionary” (that is, non-Communist).95  
In short, when an upstanding Soviet Ukrainian citizen became an OUN/UPA sympathizer, he 
became his own antithesis—a traitor to the nation of which he had never truly been a part.
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94 They did this even as thousands of pleas for the rehabilitation of convicted OUN/UPA members and 
sympathizers flooded into the party-state from the Soviet Ukrainian citizenry. So long as the Soviet Union 
existed, the regime rebuked such requests.  Weiner, Making Sense of War, 189-90.
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